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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
POSSESSION .  The parties to this action were
children of the previous owner of the disputed land who
bequeathed the land to the children in trust subject to a life
estate for the surviving spouse.  The children agreed to
partition the land in 1953 with the "knowledge of" the
surviving spouse, but the trust was not terminated.  After
the partition, the plaintiff erected a fence which enclosed a
portion of the defendant's property.  The surviving spouse
died and the trust terminated in 1973.  The court held that
the plaintiff's possession of the extra land was not adverse
because the possession was with the permission of the life
tenant until death in 1973; therefore, the plaintiff's adverse
possession did not begin until 1973, less than 20 years
before this quiet title action was commenced.  Cassada v .
Cassada, 404 S.E.2d 491 (N.C. App. 1991).
The prior owner of the plaintiffs' land had constructed a
fence several feet over the actual boundary with the
defendants' land.  When the plaintiffs purchased the land in
1953, the fence was assumed to be the actual boundary and
the plaintiffs used the disputed land for pasturing, cutting
wood and other farm uses.  The defendants argued that the
plaintiffs' possession was not hostile because the plaintiffs
stated that they did not intend to take anything that did not
belong to them.  The court held that the plaintiffs' mental
intent was not relevant to determine hostile possession and
that the plaintiffs' use of the disputed land for their own
profit was sufficient to establish hostile possession.
Selman v. Roberts, 404 S.E.2d 771 (W.Va.
1991) .
ANIMALS
FENCES .  The plaintiff sued for damages to crops
from the trespass of the defendant's cows.  The defendant
argued that the trial court erred in not using a reasonable care
standard in determining liability.  The court held that Ohio
Rev. Code § 951.02 does not place strict liability on animal
owners for trespass but only requires the animal owner to
use reasonable care in prevent trespass.  However, the
evidence in the case did not show the defendant used
reasonable care; therefore, the error was not prejudicial.  The
court also held that the landowner had no duty to mitigate
damages from trespassing animals except to notify the
animals' owner.  Rayner v. Lowe, 572 N.E.2d 2 4 5
(Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ESTATE PROPERTY.  The debtor leased a building
for a veterinary practice, including some cages, from a
landlord who had built the building for the landlord's
veterinary practice.  The debtor had exercised an option to
purchase the veterinary practice but had not exercised an
option to purchase the real property.  The court held that the
cages were part of the realty and not included in the debtor's
bankruptcy estate.  In re  Alterman, 127 B.R. 3 5 6
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991).
EXECUTORY CONTRACTS .  The debtor leased
farmland under a lease which provided the tenant with the
option to purchase the land.  Prior to the debtor's filing for
bankruptcy, the tenant attempted to exercise the option but
the debtor refused to transfer the deed.  After the debtor filed
for bankruptcy the debtor sought rejection of the purchase
option.  The court held that under Section 365(i), the tenant,
as a purchaser in possession, could enforce the purchase
option.  In re  Maier, 127 B.R. 325 (Bankr. W . D .
N.Y. 1991).
EXEMPTIONS.  The debtor's interest in an ERISA
qualified employee savings plan subject to financial hardship
restrictions on withdrawal was not exempt under federal
nonbankruptcy law because the plan was not a spendthrift
trust under state law.  The court also held that potential
fiduciary liability and loss of tax-exempt status of the plan
resulting from premature distributions from the plan were
not sufficient to bar turnover of plan funds to the
bankruptcy estate.  Employee Benefits Committee v.
Tabor, 127 B.R. 194 (S.D. Ind. 1991), aff'g  1 2 1
B.R. 1006 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1990).
The debtor was required to select which portion of the
one acre urban homestead would be eligible for the
homestead exemption which was limited to 1/4 acre or
$2,500 in value.  The court also held that the exemptions
allowed in Ark. Stats. §§ 11-66-218(a)(2)-(4), 16-66-
218(b)(16) were unconstitutional because they provided for
exemption for personal property in excess of the $500 limit
imposed by Ark. Const. art. 9, § 2.  In re  Giller, 1 2 7
B.R. 215 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1990).
After the debtors filed for Chapter 13 but before the case
was converted to Chapter 7, the Virginia legislature added an
exemption for an automobile.  The court held that the
debtors were not entitled to claim an exemption for an
automobile under the new law because the original petition
date determined the exemption law available to the debtors.
In re  Stroble, 127 B.R. 372 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1991) .
The debtor owned an insurance policy on the debtor's life
with the debtor's business as the sole beneficiary.  The
debtor claimed the cash surrender value of the policy as
exempt, claiming that the policy would inure to the benefit
of the the debtor's spouse upon the debtor's death.  The court
disagreed, holding that the policy would have to name the
debtor's spouse as beneficiary in order to be exempt.  In re
Thurman, 127 B.R. 401 (M.D. Tenn. 1991).
FIDUCIARY DUTY OF DEBTOR.  Prior to
filing for bankruptcy, the debtor had attempted to sell farm
land to a third party for $45,000 but the sale was not
completed.  The debtor then filed for bankruptcy and during
the bankruptcy case filed a motion to sell the land to the
debtor's parents for the fair market price of $14,000.  The
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sale was approved by the bankruptcy court after notice to all
creditors and a hearing.  Over one year later but still during
the bankruptcy case, the third party reoffered to purchase the
land from the debtor's parents for the same $45,000.  The
creditors argued that the debtor breached the fiduciary duty to
the creditors to disclose the prebankruptcy offer and that the
profits from the sale should be distributed to creditors.  The
court held that given the procedural correctness of the sale
and the failure of the creditors to object to the sale, the sale
was not fraudulent and the debtor did not breach any fidu-
ciary duty.  In re Schipper, 933 F.2d 513 (7th Cir .
1991), aff'g 112 B.R. 917 (N.D. Ill. 1990 ) ,
aff'g  109 B.R. 832 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
  CHAPTER 11  
CREDITORS' MEETING.  The debtor had been
charged with felony theft and the misdemeanor of purchase
of grain without a license.  The court held that the debtor
could refuse, by invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege, at
the meeting of creditors to answer questions which might
furnish evidence needed to prosecute the debtor on the
criminal charges.  In re  French, 127 B.R. 4 3 4
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
ELIGIBILITY.  The debtor was an individual who
moved for conversion of a Chapter 7 case to Chapter 11.
The lower courts had held that Chapter 11 was available
only to businesses, but the Supreme Court held that
individuals may file for Chapter 11.  Toibb v. Radloff,
111 S.Ct. 2197 (1991), rev'g  902 F.2d 14 (8th
Cir. 1990).
  CHAPTER 12  
DISMISSAL .  The Chapter 12 debtor had filed a
Chapter 11 case in which the debtor received a discharge.
After the Chapter 11 plan had been substantially completed,
the debtor filed Chapter 12.  The court found that under the
terms of the Chapter 11 plan, the debtor's income and
property values had not substantially changed; therefore, the
court held that the filing of the Chapter 12 case was not in
good faith and should be dismissed.  In re  Henke, 1 7
B.R. 255 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1991).
SETTLEMENT.  The Chapter 12 debtor reached an
agreement in settlement of claims by a creditor bank and had
the agreement read into the court record.  After the debtor
learned that the bank official with whom the debtor
negotiated was sued by the bank for wrongful acts, the
debtor moved for withdrawal of approval of the agreement.
The court held that although the wrongful acts of the bank
official may have made the agreement unfair to the debtor,
the substantial costs to the estate and other creditors from
rejecting the agreement required that the agreement be
enforced.  The court also found that the debtor had not
shown actual or constructive fraud by the bank.  Matter o f
Cotton, 127 B.R. 287 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1991).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
RESPONSIBLE PERSON .  The taxpayers were
responsible persons of the debtor corporation and were
assessed the 100 percent penalty of I.R.C. § 6672(a) for
failure of the corporation to pay employment taxes.  Under a
stipulation with the IRS in the bankruptcy case, the
corporation agreed to pay all back taxes and interest up to
the filing of the bankruptcy case.  The IRS sought recovery
of the interest during the bankruptcy case from the
taxpayers.  The court held that the taxpayers remained liable
for the interest accrued during bankruptcy.  Bradly v .
U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,332 (2d
Cir. 1991), aff'g 90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶




COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING.  The
Chicago Board of Trade has applied for contract market
designation for futures contracts of anhydrous ammonia.  56
Fed. Reg. 32559 (July 17, 1991).
DISASTER ASSISTANCE.  The CCC has adopted
as final regulations amending the livestock emergency
programs, including computing feed needs for eligible
livestock, determining feed on hand and determining owner
eligibility.  56 Fed. Reg. 33190 (July 19, 1991).
    PERISHABLE AGRIC. COMMODITIES ACT.
In a disciplinary proceeding, the buyer was ruled to have
willfully, repeatedly and flagrantly violated PACA by
failing to make prompt payment of over $273,000 for 153
lots of produce from 24 sellers.  The trustee of the
respondent's bankruptcy estate argued that revocation of the
respondent's license would put the respondent out of
business and harm produce sellers.  The Judicial Officer
stated that "hardship to the respondent's community,
customers or employees which might result from a
disciplinary order is given no weight in determining the
sanction."  The respondent's license was revoked.  In re
Charles Crook Wholesale Produce & Grocery
Co., 48 Agric. Dec. 557 (1989).
This case was remanded from a D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals' order requiring a determination as to whether a
corporation's violations of PACA had become repeated and
flagrant before the respondent had resigned as a director of
the corporation.  The ALJ found that the corporation had
failed to make prompt payment for three purchases totaling
over $5,000 before the date the respondent claimed to have
resigned; therefore, the corporation had committed repeated
and flagrant violations of PACA before the respondent
resigned.  The respondent had argued that the seller of the
produce had agreed to extend the payment time for the
purchases to 30 days.  The ALJ ruled that the agreements to
extend the time for payment were insufficient because not
reduced to writing before the sales and not proven by other
credible evidence.  In re  Veg-Mix, Inc., 48 Agric.
Dec. 595 (1989), on rem. from  832 F.2d 6 0 1
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
The complainant sold a shipment of watermelons to the
respondent and filed a reparations action for the price of the
melons.  The respondent had received and accepted the
melons but after selling about half of them, the remainder
were embargoed by the state for possible pesticide
contamination.  The Judicial Officer did not decide the issue
as to whether the melons were contaminated but ruled that
because the respondent provided insufficient evidence that
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the melons were not unmerchantible because of age or
improper storage, the respondent could not prove any breach
by the complainant.  Myco Enterprises v. Boise
Farmers Market, Inc., 48 Agric. Dec. 6 7 9
(1987) .
The complainant sold the respondent a load of potatoes
shipped f.o.b. by railroad car.  The railroad delayed delivery
by one week and the respondent had the potatoes inspected
nine days after arrival.  The inspection showed up to 9
percent dry rot and the respondent argued that the
complainant had breached the contract.  The Judicial Officer
ruled that the railroad delay was a risk of the respondent in
an f.o.b. sale and that the delivery delay and delay in
inspection made the inspection insufficient evidence that the
potatoes were not of sufficient quality under the contract.




APPORTIONMENT OF TAXES .  The decedent's
will provided for payment of all estate taxes from the
residuary estate.  Under the residuary clause, one-fourth of
the residuary estate passed to an individual and three-fourths
passed to a charitable organization.  The IRS ruled that Rev.
Rul. 76-358, 1976-2 C.B. 291 applied to estates in
Washington and that the charitable bequest was subject to
three-fourths of the estate tax.  Ltr. Rul. 9126005 ,
March 26, 1991.
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  The taxpayer
transferred rental property to a ten year trust subject to an
existing mortgage of 11.5 years.  The trust was to pay
$45,000 to a charitable organization for the term of the
trust, with the remainder to be paid at the termination of the
trust to the taxpayer's children.  The IRS ruled that the
transfer was a completed gift and was eligible for the
charitable deduction.  In addition, the trust's payment of the
mortgage would not be considered a distribution to the
taxpayer because the taxpayer had no reversionary interest in
the trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9126065, March 29, 1991.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS.  The
taxpayers, husband and wife, executed reciprocal revocable
trusts with each other as beneficiary and the grantor as
trustee, each providing for the trust to become irrevocable
upon the death of the grantor.  Upon the death of the grantor
the trust property passed in trust to the surviving spouse and
issue with the trust to be split into two parts, one equal to
the grantor's GSTT exemption.  The IRS ruled that the
GSTT exemption trust was eligible for the reverse QTIP
election.  Ltr. Rul. 9125043, no date given; Ltr.
Rul. 9126025, March 29, 1991.
LIFE INSURANCE .  As part of a stock buy-sell
agreement between the corporation and shareholders, a
corporation purchased life insurance on the life of the
decedent.  The decedent's revocable trust owned 50 percent of
the corporation stock.  Within a few months before the
decedent's death, the decedent terminated the buy-sell
agreement and created an irrevocable trust for the surviving
spouse and children.  The corporation transferred the life
insurance policy to the irrevocable trust pursuant to the
termination of the buy-sell agreement and the direction of
the decedent acting as owner of the revocable trust.  The IRS
ruled that the life insurance policy was includible in the
decedent's gross estate because the decedent held the incident
of ownership of control of transferability of ownership of
the policy when the decedent terminated the buy-sell
agreement and ordered the corporation to transfer the policy
to the irrevocable trust.  Ltr. Rul. 9127007, March
26, 1991.
MARITAL DEDUCTION.  The decedent's will
bequeathed a house and $40,000 in trust to the decedent's
children subject to the surviving spouse's right of usage
during life.  The IRS ruled that the surviving spouse's
interest in the house and cash was QTIP.  The will also
bequeathed an amount of the residuary estate in trust to the
surviving spouse for life in the amount remaining after all
other credits and deduction were taken to decrease the federal
estate tax on the estate.  The will also provided for trustee
power to split the marital trust and to make a "reverse
QTIP" election for one of the trusts to make use of any
remaining GSTT exemption.  The two trusts would each
contain a fraction interest in the marital trust property.  The
IRS ruled that the split of the marital trust was proper and
the reverse QTIP election permissable.  Ltr. R u l .
9126020, March 29, 1991.
The taxpayer transferred property to the taxpayer's spouse
in trust for life.  The trust was irrevocable and prohibited the
sale, assignment or other encumbrance of the spouse's trust
interest or trust corpus.  The IRS ruled that under Tennessee
law, the trust would terminate if the taxpayer and spouse
divorced; therefore, the spouse's trust interest was not QTIP
eligible for the marital gift tax deduction.  Ltr. R u l .
9127005, March 22, 1991.
RETURNS .  The decedent's estate was assessed an
addition to tax for failure to file the estate tax return on
time.  The court held that reliance on an accountant to
timely file the return was not reasonable cause for the late
filing and the estate executors were liable for the addition to
tax for late filing.  Est. of Russo v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1991-310.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION.  The only issue in
this case was the determination of the comparable sales
factor under Section 2032A(e)(8)(D) for use in calculating
the special use valuation of 47 acres of orchard subject to an
agricultural use restriction for county property tax purposes.
The IRS used sales of similar land with similar restrictions
within five miles of the orchard.  The estate appraisal expert
used sales of land in another county, 80 to 100 miles away.
The court adopted the estate appraisal expert's valuation
because the sales closer to the estate property had a stronger
element of investment for future residential use because of
the proximity of urban development.  Est. of Hughan v.
Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-275.
TRANSFERS  WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH.  The decedent established a revocable trust which
terminated on December 31, 1986.  In January 1987, the
decedent was informed that the trust had terminated and the
trust corpus was distributed to the trust beneficiaries.  The
decedent died one year later and the executor obtained a court
order reforming the trust to revoke the distribution.  The
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IRS ruled that the state court order revoking the distribution
was ineffective to change the gift tax consequences of the
termination of the trust by its terms.  In addition, the IRS
ruled that the trust corpus was includible in the decedent
gross estate because the termination of the trust was a
relinquishment of the decedent's power to amend the trust.
Ltr. Rul. 9127008, no dat given.
VALUATION.  The taxpayer and the taxpayer's
children purchased property with the children receiving
remainder interests.  The children paid for their interests
with separate property.  The IRS ruled that for purposes of
determining whether the children paid adequate consideration
for the remainder interests, the taxpayer could value the
remainder interests using the actuarial tables of Treas. Reg.
§ 25.2512-5(f).  The IRS also ruled that to the extent the
children paid adequate consideration for the remainder
interests, the remainder interests would not be included in




BAD DEBTS.   The taxpayer alleged a contract with
other shareholders to reimburse the taxpayer for unpaid
employment taxes owed by a corporation.  The taxpayer
claimed that the contract became worthless when the other
shareholders refused to pay.  The court denied the deduction
for the loss of the contract because no contract existed and
the other shareholders were not determined by the IRS to be
liable for the unpaid employment taxes.  Est. o f
Blazzard v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-296.
  C CORPORATIONS  
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX.  A general
partnership had an individual and two corporations as
partners.  The stock of the corporations was owned by the
children of the individual partner.  The individual partner
was also the president and board member of the two
corporations and had complete control over the corporations
under a ten year voting trust.  The individual partner caused
full distributions of income from the partnership to be
distributed to the individual partner but smaller distributions
to be made to the corporations with the effect that the
corporations did not make full dividend distributions equal to
the corporations' distributive share of partnership income.
The corporations had few assets other than the partnership
interests.  The corporations argued that because the
corporations had few liquid assets to make the distributions,
the corporations were not subject to accumulated earnings
tax.  The IRS ruled that the lack of liquid assets alone was
not sufficient to excuse the tax because the consent dividend
procedure could be used; therefore, the distributive share of
partnership income would be used to determine accumulated
earnings tax liability.  Ltr. Rul. 9124001, Feb. 1 5 ,
1991 .
EMPLOYEE BENEFITS.  A state prison provided
on and off premises lodging, on premises meals, and
groceries (including non-food items) to employees.  The
prison also paid for the utilities of the employees living on
the premises.  The IRS ruled that under Section 119 (1) the
value of on-premises lodging was excludible from the
employees' income, (2) the value of the utilities paid for on-
premises lodging was excludible, (3) the value of the off-
premises lodging and utilities were included in employee
income, (4) the value of meals provided on-premises to
employees was excludible from their income, and (5) the
value of groceries was included in employee gross income
and was subject to FICA and FUTA withholding.  Ltr.
Rul. 9126063, March 29, 1991.
HOME OFFICE.  The following ruling has been
suspended for reconsideration. The taxpayers used their home
to operate a daycare business during the day.  A portion of
several rooms was used for the business for a portion of
each day for 251 days a year.  The IRS ruled that the
expenses associated with maintaining the house were to be
allocated to each room according to the percentage square
footage of each room to the total for the house.  The
expense allocation for each room was to be allocated to the
business according to the percentage use of the room for the
business.  The total business expenses allocated to the
rooms was then to be allocated to the business according to
the percentage of the total year's use of the house for the
business.  Ltr. Rul. 9126003, March 15, 1991.  
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT.  The taxpayer
purchased and leased back wood treatment equipment.  The
court held that the equipment was not eligible for
investment tax credit because the lease terms exceeded one
half of the useful life of the equipment and the taxpayer
failed to prove that deductible business expenses exceed 15
percent of the gross rent for the first year of the lease.
Marzetta v. Comm'r, T.C. Memo. 1991-318.
The taxpayer owned a tree farm and incurred expenses for
reforestation which were required to be capitalized.  The
court held that the reforestation expenses were eligible for
investment tax credit.  Johnson v. Comm'r, T . C .
Memo. 1991-294.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE.  A limited partnership
owned two ranches, one of which operated land leased for ten
years from the state.  One of the ranches was contiguous to
a ranch owned by a corporation which also contained land
leased for ten years from the state.  Both entities had priority
in renewing their respective leases.  The two entities were
related in that the same person owned more than 50 percent
of the profits interests in both entities.  The entities agreed
to exchange the corporation's ranch for a portion of the
noncontiguous partnership ranch, with the sale of the
remaining and exchanged noncontiguous ranch land to a
third party.  The IRS ruled that no gain or loss would be
recognized from the exchange of ranch property and leased
property.  The IRS noted that the exchange of land leased for
less than 30 years for land owned in fee would result in
recognition of gain or loss, but in this case, the leases were
readily renewable and very likely to be renewed for more
than 30 years; therefore the leases would be treated as for
more than 30 years.  The IRS, under procedures announced
in Rev. Proc. 91-3, I.R.B. 1991-1, 52, would not rule on
the tax consequences of the second disposition of the
exchanged property to a third party.  Ltr. Rul. 9126007,
March 27, 1991.
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TAX LIENS.  The decedent held interests in a partner-
ship which were bequeathed to a surviving spouse who
exchanged the partnership interests for partnership property.
The partnership property was later bequeathed to the
taxpayers at the death of the surviving spouse.  The IRS
levied against the property for estate taxes owed by the first
decedent's estate.  The court held that the levy was improper
because the lien could attach only to the decedent's interest
in the partnership and not to specific partnership property.
Because the case was decided on this issue, the court did not
reach the basis of the lower court's decision.  See Vol. 1,
No. 8, p. 66.  Beaty v. U.S., 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 60,077 (6th Cir. 1991), rev'g and
rem'g  90-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 6 0 , 0 0 4
(E.D. Tenn. 1989).
LANDLORD AND TENANT
BREACH OF LEASE.  The lessor of a rice farm
sued the tenant for breach of the crop share lease for failure
to restrain livestock, maintain fences and the irrigation
system, and to plant the full quota of rice.  The lessees
counterclaimed for loss of profits from the lessor's failure to
sign up for federal farm subsidy programs.  The trial court
found that the lessee had managed the farm in compliance
with the lease.  The appellate court held that the trial court's
ruling was supported by the evidence but reinstated the
lessees' claim for damages for lost profits resulting from the
lessor's failure to sign up for the federal farm subsidy
program.  Romero v. Herpin, 579 So.2d 1218 (La.
Ct. App. 1991).
PARTNERSHIPS
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY.  Two brothers
operated a farm until the death of one of the brothers and the
farm operation ceased.  The deceased brother's estate sued for
an accounting and damages resulting from breach of
fiduciary duty and use of partnership property by the
surviving brother.  The jury awarded the estate money that
the surviving partner failed to account for to the partnership,
money damages and pre-petition interest.  The trial court
also partitioned the farm property between the surviving
brother and the estate.  The surviving brother argued that the
money award was improper because an accounting was not
first reached.  The appellate court upheld the money award as
essentially an accounting determination by the jury, with
the balance due the estate as the money awarded.  The
surviving brother also argued that the partitioning of the
farm was improper because the court could only rule as to
whether the property involved was partnership or individual
property.  The court held that partnership property could be
partitioned only after specific pleadings and a hearing.  The
appellate court also reversed the damage award and pre-
petition interest award because both awards required a prior
accounting and settlement.  Biggs v. First Nat'l Bank




PREPARER'S LIEN.  A feed company sold
processed feed grain to the debtor for dairy cattle feed.  The
feed company claimed a priority lien in the debtor's cash
collateral under Wash. Code § 60.13.030.  The court held
that the feed company was not eligible for the statutory lien
because the feed company did not produce the grain sold as
feed.  In re  Young, 127 B.R. 456 (Bankr. W . D .
Wash. 1991).
SALE OF COLLATERAL.  The debtors had
personally guaranteed the leases of meat processing
equipment to a corporation.  After the corporation's default
on the leases, the lessor sold some of the equipment but did
not give the debtors notice of the sales until after the sales
were completed.  The remainder of the equipment was placed
in storage while the lessor made continuing efforts to sell it.
The debtors argued that they should be released from the
guarantees because the lessor failed to give them prior notice
of the sales and the storage of the remaining equipment
should be considered acceptance of the equipment in
satisfaction of the leases.  The court held that, under Oregon
law, the failure to provide prior notice of the sales resulted
only in a presumption that the value of the equipment was
equal to the amounts owed on the leases; however, the
lessor rebutted the presumption with sufficient evidence that
the sales prices equalled the fair market value of the
equipment.  The court also held that the remaining
equipment was not accepted by the lessor in satisfaction of
the lease amounts because the lessor made continuing efforts
to sell the equipment.  In re McDaniel, 127 B.R. 132
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991).
The debtors had granted to the defendant bank security
interests in logging equipment and real estate.  After the
debtors defaulted on the notes secured by the property, the
bank repossessed the personal property and sold it with prior
notification to the debtors.  The bank applied the proceeds to
the debtor's obligations and sought foreclosure of the
mortgaged real estate.  The debtors argued that the bank
should be barred from any further proceedings against
collateral because the sale of the personal property violated
the UCC notification requirements.  The court acknowledged
that in pure UCC cases, the failure to notify would result in
no further action against the debtors by the secured creditor,
but that in pure real property cases, the UCC rule did not
apply.  The court held that the bank would be able to
proceed against the real estate but only for the amount of
debt remaining after the reasonable value of the personal
property had been subtracted.  The case was remanded for a
determination of the reasonable value of the personal
property.  Bank of Bearden v. Simpson, 8 0 8







MILK.  Cheese manufacturers challenged an amend-
ment to the milk marketing plans which provided for a
cheese specific pricing formula for milk used to make
cheese.  The plaintiffs contended that the pricing formula
was invalid because it failed to consider the adequacy of the
cheese supply, did not set prices reasonably related to the
value of the milk used to manufacture cheese, and arbitrarily
set the moisture factor, the reasonably efficient plant factor
and yield factor.  The court held that although the pricing
formula may not have been the best for the plaintiffs, the
formula was supported by the evidence and was within the
permissable range of formulas.  Golden Cheese Co. o f
Cal. v. Voss, 281 Cal. Rptr. 587 (Cal. C t .
App. 1991).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL USE .  The plaintiffs owned
farmland enrolled in the Vermont Working Farm Tax
Abatement Program which was leased to their son.  Most of
the land was sold to a third party who was not a farmer but
who continued to lease the land to the plaintiffs' son.  The
new owner was eligible for the tax abatement.  However,
under Vt. Stat. § 3764, the sale of the land disqualified the
land for the tax abatement as to the plaintiffs because the
buyer was not a farmer.  The court upheld the
disqualification as constitutional because the provision
furthered the purpose of keeping farmland in the hands of
working farmers.  Dykstra v. Property Valuation &
Review Div., 591 A.2d 63 (Vt. 1991).
CITATION UPDATES
In re  Johnson, 111 S.Ct. 2150 (1991), rev'g
904 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'g 96 B . R .
326 (D. Kan. 1989) (bankruptcy eligibility) see p. 112
supra.
Vorshek v. Comm'r, 933 F.2d 757 (9th Cir .
1991)(partnership deductions), see p. 115 supra.
CORRECTION: Est. of Prince v. Comm'r, T.C.
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  Homestead 131
  Life insurance 131
  Pension plan 131










Commodity futures trading 132
Disaster assistance 132
PACA 132
Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Apportionment of taxes 133
Charitable deduction 133




Special use valuation 133






Accumulated earnings tax 134
Employee benefits 134
Home office 134









Sale of collateral 135
State Regulation of Agriculture
Milk 136
State Taxation
Agricultural use 136
